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Arguing the Constitutionality of the
Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Chan
v. PRI Automation, Inc.
(United States District Court
of Massachusetts)
United
States District Judge Robert Keeton (D. Mass.) asked "any
interested member of the Bar of this Court" for comments on six
questions he has raised concerning the constitutionality of the
"lead plaintiff" provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). Congress
enacted the lead plaintiff provisions to encourage institutional
investors
with a large stake in securities litigation to represent the class and
exercise effective management of plaintiffs' lawyers. Congress acted
out of concern that a named class representative with a minimal
financial stake in the outcome might be acting as an instrument of
class action plaintiffs attorneys who had recruited that individual. Kai Chan, a purchaser of common stock in PRI Automation, Inc.,
brought a class action suit against PRI and various directors and
officers alleging that PRI prepared and disseminated false and
misleading information in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934. There are five
related actions currently pending before Judge Keeton and more than
one plaintiff has sought to be named "lead plaintiff."
The provisions of the PSLRA that are of concern to Judge Keeton
provide for the appointment of the lead plaintiff in securities class
actions. Under lead
plaintiff provisions, a plaintiff filing a new putative class action
must "cause to be published, in a widely circulated national
business-oriented publication or wire service, a notice advising
members of the purported plaintiff class" of the pending action.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (a) (3) (A) (i).
The notice must advise the class that "any member of the
purported class may move the court to serve as lead plaintiff of the
purported class." Id.
Within 90 days after the notice is published, the court
"shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the
purported class that the court determines to be most capable of
adequately representing the interests of the class members."
Id. § 78u-4-(a)(3)(B)(i).
The PSLRA creates a rebuttable presumption that the "most
adequate plaintiff . . . is
the person or group of persons" who has sought the role,
otherwise meets the requirements of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and "in the determination of the court, has the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class."
NELF contended that none of these provisions are
constitutionally infirm. On
June 15, 2001, Judge Keeton ruled that the provision requiring the
court to appoint a lead plaintiff within 90 days violated the
separation of powers doctrine, finding that Congress did not have
authority to place a deadline on the exercise of judicial discretion.
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