Ciardi v. BASF A.G. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court)

The parties in this price-fixing antitrust case agree that, under the Illinois Brick doctrine, indirect purchasers cannot state a claim under the Massachusetts Antitrust Act. The Superior Court concluded, however, that they may pursue the identical antitrust claim under the Consumer Protection Act, Chapter 93A. The Superior Court reasoned that price fixing is an unfair method of competition prohibited by Chapter 93A and, since the Legislature removed the privity requirement for consumer suits in 1979, without making any reference to the Antitrust Act, it intended to permit consumers to assert antitrust claims under Chapter 93A. The Superior Court reported its decision to the Appeals Court. NELF filed an amicus brief, arguing that, while states may permit indirect purchasers to sue for antitrust violations, it is doubtful that the Legislature intended to authorize such suits when it amended Chapter 93A. The Massachusetts Antitrust Act was enacted in 1908 and was enforceable only by the Attorney General until private rights of action were added in 1978. This revision occurred one year after the Supreme Court’s Illinois Brick decision which is incorporated by reference. Illinois Brick’s prohibition indirect purchaser suits was based on policy considerations: avoiding multiple liability, avoiding the additional complexity that would be injected into already complex antitrust litigation, and encouraging effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.  NELF also contended that the Court failed to construe the statutes harmoniously, producing an inconsistent body of law. It is inconsistent to hold that the more specific Antitrust Act precludes suits by indirect purchasers because they have not been injured but permit such suits under Chapter 93A’s injury requirement. In a decision issued on February 8, 2002, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that indirect purchasers can assert claims for antitrust violations under Chapter 93A even though they are barred from asserting those same claims under the state antitrust statute. The SJC acknowledged the the potential difficulties raised by its decision, but asserted that the solution was "... the province of the Massachusetts Legislature to make its own policy decisions...[and that] (a)ny disagreement with the statute should be directed to the Legislature."