Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., No. 03-1530, 2004 WL 528310 (1st Cir. Mar. 18, 2004) 

The question in this case was whether charges of employment discrimination under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (the “Civil Rights Act”), should be governed by the one-year statute of limitations of the more specific Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (the “Fair Employment Act”) or the three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries. Rejecting NELF's call for consistency in employment discrimination cases, the First Circuit applied the three-year rule. Plaintiff Betsey Rathbun was an employee of AutoZone, which promoted three men to a management position before promoting her and hired or promoted three other men to higher management positions. AutoZone asserted that all six men had superior qualifications to Rathbun. Only two of the six allegedly discriminatory promotions of men over Rathbun, however, occurred within one year of the time that she filed suit.  Convinced that male employees at AutoZone received greater pay increases and more rapid promotion than she did, Rathbun filed suit in Rhode Island Superior Court in August, 2001, alleging violations of the Fair Employment Act and the Civil Rights Act. AutoZone removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island based on diversity jurisdiction. The United States District Court granted AutoZone’s summary judgment motion based, in part, on the District Court’s conclusion that the one-year statute of limitations applicable in the Fair Employment Act also applied to the Civil Rights Act, and Rathbun appealed. In its amicus brief filed in support of Autozone, NELF emphasized the strong policy reasons behind short employment discrimination statutes of limitation. NELF also argued that sound principles of statutory interpretation warrant borrowing the Fair Employment Act statute of limitations for the Civil Rights Act employment discrimination actions. The Court, NELF argued, should strive to eliminate inconsistencies between the Fair Employment Act and the Civil Rights Act. Because the Civil Rights Act is a broader statute than the Fair Employment Act and covers virtually any the Fair Employment Act violation, the Civil Rights Act would render the Fair Employment Act’s well thought-through explicit one-year statute of limitations nugatory unless it also applied to claims under the Civil Rights Act. Otherwise, a dilatory employment discrimination plaintiff could receive the same or better relief by suing under the Civil Rights Act more than one year after allegedly discriminatory conduct.  While the First Circuit considered NELF's arguments carefully, the Court was ultimately persuaded that the federal model for the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, utilizes the general personal injury statute of limitations and that uniform interpretation of the Civil Rights Act required a single limitations period, not variable periods depending on whether alleged discrimination occurred in the employment context or elsewhere, as in education or housing.