New England Legal Foundation
  • Home
  • About
    • Mission & History
    • Annual Reports
    • Board of Directors
    • State Advisory Councils >
      • Connecticut
      • Maine
      • Massachusetts
      • New Hampshire
      • Rhode Island
      • Vermont
    • Trustees
    • Members
    • Staff
    • Job & Internship Opportunities
  • News & Events
  • Docket
  • Briefs
  • Donate
  • Contact

Stonehill College v. MCAD

6/9/2004

 
Defending Respondents’ Rights to Jury Trials under the Massachusetts Antidiscrimination Law

The Massachusetts antidiscrimination law, Chapter 151B, allows an individual claiming discrimination to commence either an administrative proceeding before the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (“MCAD”) or a lawsuit. In 1994 the Supreme Judicial Court held in Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, Inc that a complainant’s judicial determination includes a right to a jury trial under the Massachusetts Constitution.  By contrast, a respondent has no statutory right to elect an immediate judicial determination of the claim, but may seek a judicial review of the MCAD decision under the Administrative Procedures Act if the claimant elected to go to the MCAD.  In 1997, to preserve the constitutionality of the statute, the SJC extended a jury trial right to respondents as well (Lavelle v. MCAD). Because the SJC wanted to preserve a role for the MCAD, Lavelle permitted respondents to claim jury trials only after final MCAD action, which can take up to eight years.  Lavelle left a host of issues unresolved, and, with four cases pending before it that raise such issues, the SJC requested amicus briefs on themand on the question of whether its decision in Dalis was correct.  

In a brief submitted jointly with Associated Industries of Massachusetts and the Boston Area Management Attorneys Group, NELF argued that Dalis correctly granted jury trial rights to complainants but that Lavelle violated respondents’ guarantee of equal protection by delaying their right to a jury for years pending final MCAD action.  NELF argued that with a fundamental constitutional right at stake, the SJC failed to examine whether a compelling state interest justified such a disparity and, if so, whether its limitation of respondents’ jury trial right was narrowly tailored. In their supplemental brief, NELF and the amici took issue with the MCAD/employee argument that jury trial rights attach only to § 9 proceedings, where the complainant elects to go to court, and not to appeals from administrative proceedings originally brought before the MCAD under § 5.  NELF also argued that if the Court were persuaded that there is no jury trial right after § 5 proceedings, then the Court must overrule its decisions allowing the MCAD to award emotional distress damages, since those are quintessential legal damages of the sort customarily awarded by juries. 

The Court, over a strong dissent by Justice Cowin and a concurrence by Justice Sosman that reads more like a dissent, held that Dalis was correct in recognizing a constitutional jury trial right under § 9, but that Lavelle erred when it extended that right to § 5 proceedings. The Court characterized § 9 and § 5 proceedings as fundamentally different, the former a private action between two parties and the latter an administrative enforcement action vindicating the interest of the general public in the eradication of discrimination.  The Court went on, in reasoning Justice Sosman characterized as “inconsistent,” to permit the MCAD to continue to award emotional distress damages.  In the only bright spot in the decision the Court explicitly announced that “a finding of discrimination, or retaliation, by itself, is no longer sufficient to permit an inference of, or a presumption of, emotional distress.”  In what might be read as a rebuke to the MCAD for its ready issuance of five- and six-figure emotional distress damage awards, the Court laid out criteria for such awards and admonished judges hearing c. 30A appeals from MCAD rulings to set aside or reduce emotional distress awards for which there is insufficient evidence.


Comments are closed.

    The Docket

    To obtain a copy of any of NELF's briefs, contact us at info@nelfonline.org.

    Categories

    All
    1st Circuit Court Of Appeals
    2nd Circuit Court Of Appeals
    3rd Circuit Court Of Appeals
    Business Litigation Session
    CT
    CT Superior Court
    CT Supreme Court
    Employer Employee Relationships
    February 2018
    February 2019
    Government Regulation/Administration Of Justice
    MA
    MA Appeals Court
    MA Division Of Administrative Law Appeals
    March 2015
    MA Superior Court
    MA Supreme Judicial Court
    MA US District Court
    ME
    ME Supreme Judicial Court
    NH
    NH Supreme Court
    Property Rights
    RI
    RI Supreme Court
    SCOTUS
    United States Supreme Court
    US Court Of Appeals Federal Circuit
    US District Court ME
    VT
    VT Supreme Court

    RSS Feed

    Archives

    August 2020
    June 2020
    January 2020
    June 2019
    April 2019
    October 2018
    June 2018
    February 2018
    October 2017
    October 2016
    June 2016
    February 2016
    October 2015
    June 2015
    March 2015
    October 2014
    June 2014
    February 2014
    October 2013
    June 2013
    February 2013
    October 2012
    June 2012
    February 2012
    October 2011
    June 2011
    February 2011
    October 2010
    June 2010
    February 2010
    October 2009
    February 2009
    October 2008
    June 2008
    February 2008
    October 2007
    June 2007
    October 2006
    June 2006
    February 2006
    October 2005
    June 2005
    February 2005
    October 2004
    June 2004
    February 2004
    October 2003
    May 2003
    February 2003
    September 2002
    May 2002
    February 2002
    May 2001